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SOUTH CAROLINA
Barnhill v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 511 S.E.2d 361 (S.C. 1999)
(holding an ordinance restricting jet-ski landing on a public beach
was within the city's police power, not preempted by state law, did not
violate a state constitutional right to access navigable waters, was not a
regulatory taking, and did not violate the equal protection clause).
Plaintiff-respondent, Bob Barnhill, operated a jet ski rental
business. The City of North Myrtle Beach enacted an ordinance
prohibiting launching and beaching jet skis between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m. from May 15 to September 15 annually on the beach where
Barnhill operated his business. This ordinance effectively denied
Barnhill's clientele the use of jet skis during the day throughout the
duration of the summer. Barnhill bought a declaratory judgment
action challenging the ordinance's validity and seeking an injunction
against its enforcement. A special referee, upon reviewing the case,
declared the ordinance invalid. The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed.
The supreme court addressed: (1) the purview of municipal police
power; (2) potential state statute preemption of the ordinance; (3)
potential inconsistencies between the ordinance and the state
constitution; (4) whether the ordinance constituted a regulatory
taking; and (5) the applicability of the equal protection clause.
When addressing the municipal police power argument, the
supreme court held that municipalities have broad powers to enact
ordinances promoting safety and that the exercise of the
municipality's police power in enacting the ordinance had a
reasonable relation to the protection of people on crowded beaches
during the summer.
The court held that state statutes do not preempt the ordinance.
The court determined that in order for a state statute to preempt a
municipal ordinance, the two must be inconsistent or irreconcilable.
The state statutes alleged by Barnhill to preempt the ordinance
addressed only activities "on the water of the state" and failed to
mention public beaches; therefore, the court held that the ordinance
was neither inconsistent nor irreconcilable with the laws of the state
because it addressed an area the state legislation failed to address.
After examining the language of the state constitution, the court
held that even though the constitution required public access to the
state's navigable waters, a municipality could constitutionally subject
The court interpreted
public access to reasonable regulation.
reasonable regulation as regulation rationally related to a legitimate
purpose. The court held that since some access remained, the
restriction was reasonable and the government's purpose of safety was
adequate to survive a constitutional challenge.
Additionally, the court held that a person does not have a private
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vested right in a particular use of government property and therefore
denied Barnhill's regulatory takings claim.
When addressing the equal protection claim, the court held that
an equal protection claim is actionable if a municipality intentionally
enforced a law discriminatorily. The court held the municipality did
not enforce this ordinance discriminatorily. The ordinance survived
all of Barnhill's challenges.
Amy W Beatie

TEXAS
Brainard v. State, No. 98-0578, 1999 WL 795545 (Tex. Oct. 7, 1999)
(holding that the doctrines of riparian ownership, such as accretion,
reliction, and erosion, apply to changes in a river's course due to
artificial as well as natural causes for deciding boundary disputes).
In 1962, the United States Bureau of Reclamation constructed the
Sanford Dam on the Canadian River to create a water supply for city
members and to provide regional flood controls. Three years after the
dam's completion, the Canadian River Municipal Water Authority
("CRMWA"), a state agency, took control of the dam. The dam
reduced the flow of river water and encouraged more vegetation in the
river's former riverbed.
Twenty years later, in 1985, the General Land Office ("GLO")
announced its intention to determine the historical gradient line prior
to the artificial changes caused by the dam. In 1987, the GLO sent a
position paper to the people who owned land along the river
("Landowners"), claiming the former streambed was the State's
property. The GLO's artificial change theory asserted that surveyors
marking the gradient boundary of the river need not consider
conditions on a river influenced by human activity, like the Sanford
Dam's construction. The Landowners disagreed with the State's
position. Although both parties agreed that the Landowners were
riparian owners and that the State owned the bed of the Canadian
River, each party sought a judicial declaration of the boundary
between the State's riverbed and Landowner's riparian tracts. The
parties also agreed that the gradient boundary methodology would
determine the line between public and private ownership along the
banks of a navigable stream.
The Landowners sued the State and the GLO to establish the
boundary of the Canadian River. Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment asking the trial court to rule on the correct survey
to mark the boundary. The GLO asked for a ruling based on the
artificial change theory, and the Landowners asked for the court to
consider the present conditions. The trial court rejected the State's
artificial change theory as a matter of law. The court held that the

